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I: Media and Modernity
Jin: From Spreading the News to Network Nation, “communications”
has been a main focus of your research and writing. How did you first
become interested in the subject? And why does it matter for historians?
John: I came to the study of communications largely by accident. As a
graduate student in the history of American civilization at Harvard in
the 1980s, I was looking around for a dissertation topic. My initial plan
was to study how canonical American authors wrote about failure; it
occurred to me that a history of bureaucratic fatalism would be a good
place to begin. I had written about industrial decline in early-twentieth-
century New England in my undergraduate thesis, which I completed
in 1981, also at Harvard (in social studies), and I was interested in ex -
panding on this project.
e problem with bureaucratic fatalism was, how did one go
about studying its origins? When did it begin? It occurred to me that it
would make sense to ask: what was the first American bureaucracy? In
a lecture that I attended shortly after I began my graduate studies, the
nineteenth-century U. S. historian David Donald observed almost in
passing that the first American bureaucracy was…the post office. He
was glossing, I later figured out, a monograph on Jacksonian politics by
the political scientist Matthew A. Crenshaw. Donald’s observation
about the post office intrigued me. Why, not, I asked myself, organize
my dissertation around what a large number of contemporaries from
various walks of life thought about a single bureaucracy, rather than, as
had been my original idea, what a small number of canonical authors
had written about a large number of bureaucracies? is is how I decid-
ed to write a dissertation about the post office: it was to be a case study
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in the origins of bureaucratic fatalism — a phenomena much in evi-
dence in the United States of the 1960s and 1970s, the America in
which I grew up.
I did not immediately give up my interest in the history of failure,
but I soon discovered, when I began to work in the sources, that bu -
reaucratic fatalism was most emphatically not the lens through which
nineteenth-century Americans customarily viewed the post office. And,
so, I lost interest in bureaucratic fatalism, and decided to explore instead
what Americans did in fact think about the post office. 
While I had decided to write about the post office primarily because
of my interest in American culture, I was not unaware that it was a large
organization, and that large organizations were the specialty of Alfred
D. Chandler, Jr., a historian I very much admired.
Chandler was a comparative institutionalist, a mode of inquiry that
I had been introduced to as an undergraduate, but which I had not ini-
tially intended to pursue. Chandler’s scholarship — in combination
with his almost obsessive curiosity, herculean commitment to research,
personal modesty, and gentlemanly demeanor — made a great impres-
sion on me. I have, incidentally, since written two review essays on his
oeuvre: if anyone is interested, links can be found at my Columbia web-
site. Chandler’s presence at Harvard was one of the main reasons I
decided to stay on at Harvard for my Ph. D. He was the perfect com-
plement to David Donald, the co-director of my dissertation. Chandler
got me interested in organizations, while Donald, a consummate liter-
ary stylist and a legendary taskmaster, kept me on track. 
To help me better understand how giant organizations worked, I
sat in on a course on the sociology of communications taught by the
sociologist Daniel Bell. e break-up of the Bell System was in the
news, and Bell devoted several lectures to this topic. It was here that I
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first learned about Harold Innis’s concept of the “bias” of communica-
tions, a topic that I would write about in Spreading the News, and that
has remained an interest of mine ever since. 
In looking back on my graduate years, I would add that there is at
least one additional reason that had nothing to do with my graduate
training that helps explain why I ended up writing about the history of
an organization, and, in particular, a government agency. And this can
be found in the circumstances of my upbringing. 
My father was a rocket scientist-turned government administrator
(for many years he was director of the Volpe Transportation System
Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts); for this reason alone, it is per-
haps not surprising that from an early age I had misgivings about histo-
ries of the United States that left out, as most did, big business, com-
munications networks, the military-industrial complex, and the state. 
My immediate surroundings mattered as well. I grew up in Lexing -
ton, Massachusetts, a town famous in the annals of American history as
the site of the first military encounter in the American War of Inde -
pendence. While the trappings of Lexington’s colonial past remained,
the Lexington I knew was a leafy, well-to-to bedroom suburb for pro-
fessionals — doctors, professors, and engineers working on top-secret
military projects. e colonial past seemed far away. e United States
and the USSR remained locked in a Cold War, the Vietnam War raged,
and a post-Watergate cynicism pervaded public discourse. 
During my high school summers, which coincided with the bicen-
tennial of the American Revolution, I dressed up as a colonial militia-
man to give public presentations on the Lexington Common to the
thousands and thousands of tourists who had flocked to my home town
to learn about the War of Independence. When I drove with tourists to
Concord along the “Battle Road,” I could clearly see an air force base
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through the trees that had been planted to shield the “colonial” land-
scape from the twentieth-century present. e juxtaposition was jarring:
I was growing up in Leo Marx’s military-industrial complex in the gar-
den.
ough Network Nation was considerably longer than Spreading the
News, it honed in on a narrower set of issues. My goal was to tell the
history of the formative era of American telecommunication by tracing
the commercialization, popularization, and naturalization of two net-
works, the telegraph and the telephone. When I began my research on
this project at the Smithsonian Institution’s Woodrow Wilson Center
in 1998-1999, it was conventional to study the early history of the tele-
graph and telephone in relationship to developments that had taken
place in the recent past. As a historian, I chose the opposite approach:
in stead of looking backward from the vantage post of the millennium,
I looked forward from the early republic, a period that I knew pretty
well, having recently completed my book on the post office. ough I
did not ignore entirely the influence of communications on society —
an influence I had written a good deal about in Spreading the News —
my primary goal was to document how society shaped communica-
tions. Twelve years later, I published Network Nation. 
Network Nation can be read as a supplement to, and even a critique
of, a famous argument of Chandler’s. Chandler contended, in a book
that he published in 1962 entitled Strategy and Structure, that business
strategy could shape organizational structure. Building on, and modify-
ing, Chandler’s strategy-structure thesis, I contended, in Network Na -
tion, that political structure could shape business strategy. Chandler as -
sumed that the influence on business strategy of the political structure
had been vastly overrated, and that, at least in the period before the
Second World War, governmental institutions reacted to changes that
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originated inside organizations. Following the lead of the political soci-
ologist eda Skocpol, a major source of inspiration from my graduate
days onward, I was determined to “bring the state back in.” 
Let me now say something about why communications is, or ought
to be, a compelling subject for historians. Communications in my view
is a field rather than a discipline: it is too capacious to be studied in a
single way. In the English language, as a colleague who specializes in the
Greek and Roman classics has reminded me, the words “communica-
tions,” “communion,” and “community” are etymologically linked.
Each is an expression of a mysterious process: action-at-a-distance. Ety -
mology, of course, is not destiny. Yet these associations remind us that
communications has long been associated with some of the most pro-
found dimensions of existence. 
Action-at-distance is a metaphor not only for the mysterious gravi-
tational force that holds the planets in their orbit, but also for the com-
munion of souls. e “annihilation of space” that the poet Alexander
Pope wrote about referred to the power of divine intervention to bring
together distant lovers. John Durham Peter’s Speaking into the Air: A
History of the Idea of Communication makes this point particularly effec-
tively: to be credible, any explanation for action-at-a-distance has to
reckon with the mysteries of the universe. e affinities between com-
munications, communion, and community may help explain why so
many media scholars are deeply religious. is was true, for example,
not only of Peters, a devout Mormon, but also of Marshall McLuhan,
James Carey, Walter Ong, Jacques Ellul and, with qualifications, Har -
old Innis. 
Yet communications is not only an otherworldly practice. For it
also exists in the here-and-now. It is for this reason that I prefer to write
“communications” with an “s” rather than “communication” without
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the “s.” e latter term, “communication,” is used more typically in
English to refer exclusively to the interpretation of a message, rather
than to the means by which the message is shared.
Historical methods are useful for some communications-related
projects, but by no means for all. Even so, I do believe, given the re -
markable expansion of information technology since the mid-eigh-
teenth century, that the historically grounded exploration of communi-
cations networks offers great promise for anyone interested in under-
standing the rise of capitalism and the emergence of the nation-state.
e study of communications networks can also provide rich insights
into nationalism, democracy, scientific research, military strategy, social
psychology, literary culture, mass society, religion, reform movements,
and many other topics. Historians who are interested in these topics
would be well advised to pay more attention than they customarily do
not only to the networks that circulate information, but also to the
medium in which the information is conveyed. You don’t ask a fish
about water, McLuhan once quipped. e same has long been true of
communications. Only now, with the emergence of new forms of digi-
tal media, is it becoming possible to begin to understand the media
ecology of the past. e owl of Minerva, as Hegel once wrote, flies at
dusk. So too do historians of communications.
Jin: In Spreading the News and Network Nation, you show how the post
of fice and telecommunications, as agents of change, helped to make
Amer ica. How do you understand the historical role of “communica-
tions” in the nineteenth century? For example, do you build on Daniel
Bell’s concept of an “information society”? 
John: In Spreading the News I contended that the creation of a spatially
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extensive communications network in the period between 1792 and
1835 helped to shape a nascent national identity for the inhabitants of
a far-flung commercial republic. Many people were left out of the imag-
ined community, a point that I was aware of, and wrote about, but that
I would say even more about if I were writing this book today. But this
imagined community did exist, and it did not just happen: it was a de -
liberate political achievement. Between 1835 and 1861, however, the
same network would create a cultural dynamic that would drive
Americans apart — laying the groundwork for a horrific civil war. 
Daniel Bell’s concept of the “information society” does not provide
much insight into this story. I am quite certain about this, since I knew
him slightly, and attended two of his lecture courses, one in college and
one in graduate school. Once I even once got up the courage to ask him
if my own project could in any way fit into his “information society”
model. Bell responded that it could not. e reason was simple. For
Bell, information could not become an agent of change at any point
prior to the twentieth century, since it was only at this time that knowl-
edge supplanted industry and agriculture as a mode of production. 
I regard Bell’s perspective as unduly narrow. And I am not alone.
Economic historians such as Joel Mokyr have long emphasized that the
eighteenth-century European Enlightenment was a kind-of “informa-
tion society”; others have made comparable claims for early modern
Europe. 
In retrospect, I have come to recognize in Bell’s tripartite stage-
model a variant of the stage-based model of technical change that
Chandler popularized in Visible Hand, a topic that I reflected on in two
essays that I published on Chandler’s oeuvre in the Business History
Review. And, while I am on the subject of historiography, I might take
the liberty of adding that I tried, in a 1995 essay on “American His -
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torians and the Concept of the Communications Revolution,” to fit
Bell’s “information society” into the broad sweep of American history.
In this essay, and, in more detail in Spreading the News, I sketched some
of the main features of a pre-electric telegraph “communications revo-
lution” that had been organized around the mail, the stagecoach, the
optical telegraph, and the newspaper. It was this communications revo-
lution that the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville observed when
he toured the United States in 1831-32, and that he would later write
about in Democracy in America. In so doing, I helped to reintroduce the
concept of an early nineteenth-century “communications revolution” to
the lexicon of American historians; it would later be picked up by Paul
Starr in his Creation of the Media, before becoming a centerpiece of
Daniel Walker Howe’s Pulitzer-Prize-winning What Hath God
Wrought.
Jin: I am impressed by your contention that the invention of optical
telegraphy in the 1790s and the establishment of postal distribution
centers in 1800, rather than the commercialization of the electric tele-
graph in the 1840s, marked the epochal separation of communication
from transportation that James W. Carey and others have written so
much about. Do you think Carey would agree with you? Will our cur-
rent view of the history of communications be revised accordingly?
John: Carey was one of the first media scholars I read, and one of the
first scholars of any kind to write expansively about the electric tele-
graph as an agent of change. For these reasons, I own him a great debt.
Our relationship is not merely intellectual: When he died, I took his
position at the Columbia Journalism School, where I now teach.
I only met Carey once. It was at a communications conference
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somewhere in the United States, I can’t remember the city. e media
sociologist Michael Schudson — who, like myself, currently teaches in
Columbia’s Ph. D. program in communications — facilitated the intro-
duction, aware of our shared interest in the history of electric telegra-
phy. I asked Carey about the priority of the optical telegraph in the sep-
aration of communications from transportation. Carey responded that
he was aware of the existence of the optical telegraph, but remained
convinced that the electric telegraph marked the key turning point. We
agreed to disagree. I can’t remember if we talked about the postal dis-
tribution center.
I have found it gratifying that my revisionist arguments about the
optical telegraph and the postal distribution center are slowly being
accepted, beginning with the publication in 2000 of Headrick’s When
Information Came of Age. In my view, Carey was unduly influenced by
Lewis Mumford, whose Technics and Civilization had been organized
around the historical significance of different kinds of motive power as
agent of change (wind, steam, electricity). Energy transitions matter,
but so too does state-building, a factor that Carey downplayed. For
Carey, the “transmission”-binding bias in American communications
was a cultural imperative rather than the byproduct of political fiat. In
Spreading the News, I made the case for governmental institutions as
agents of change.
e rediscovery of the optical telegraph owes something to national
pride. e French government built the biggest optical telegraph net-
work, and, perhaps not surprisingly, French historians have long as -
signed the optical telegraph priority in the honor role of telecommuni-
cations breakthroughs. I agree. As the field becomes more cosmopoli-
tan, and we are less swept up in what Carey himself termed the rhetoric
of the “electrical sublime,” I would guess that a new consensus might
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well emerge, in which the optical telegraph assumes its rightful place in
the annals of communications.
Since you asked about the postal distribution center, let me say a
bit more about this important yet often ignored institution. To trans-
mit the mail around the country, administrators found it necessary to
create a network in which certain offices were, in the language of net-
work theory, nodes. ese nodes were the distribution centers, which
had been formally established by the Federalist postmaster general Jo -
seph Haber sham in 1800. eir establishment marked the decisive
juncture at which the transportation of the mail was distinguished from
its circulation, or what we could call its communication.
e millions and millions of pieces of mail that circulated in the
nineteenth century depended on the administrative coordination that
the managers of the distribution centers provided. For this reason, I
would call them the nation’s first middle managers — a claim that Al
Chandler accepted as a revision to his contention that middle manage-
ment originated in mid-nineteenth century railroads.
If we are serious about recognizing the role of communications net-
works as agents of change, then it would seem hard to deny that the
mail, and not the telegraph, was the true “Victorian Internet.” When
this analogy becomes more widely acknowledged, then I would imagine
that even the postal distribution center will finally get the recognition it
deserves. 
Jin: You object to “imputing agency” to technology and argue that to
contend that technological inventions led in some predetermined way
to the establishment of a particular organizational structure or business
strategy is to “obscure the historical process by imputing agency to elec-
trical equipment, batteries, and wires.” Yet I also notice that, in the
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introduction to Network Nation, you mention that the mail, the optical
telegraph, the electric telegraph, and telephone were so different that
they were organized in different ways. Could you please remind us what
you mean by this?
John: e communications networks that I wrote about in Spreading
the News and Network Nation were organized differently primarily
because of the institutional arrangements in which they were embed-
ded. ese institutional arrangements had little to do with the motive
power that facilitated the circulation of information, or what media
scholars sometimes call messages. It was, for example, entirely possible
for an optical telegraph to be owned and operated not by the state, but
by merchants, as was the case in the United States and Great Britain. 
Political economy, and not motive power, held the key. In the
United States, the optical telegraph and the post office emerged in a re -
publican political economy; the telegraph in an anti-monopoly political
economy; and the telephone in a progressive political economy. at is,
the independent variable was not the motive power, but the po litical-
economic rules of the game. Technology proposed; political economy
di sposed. 
II: Bringing Institutions Back In
Jin: Historical writing on telecommunications has been informed by
different interpretative traditions. e first is associated with the so-
called Toronto School of Harold A. Innis and Marshall McLuhan and
their U. S. epigones James W. Carey and Neil Postman; its central con-
cern is the challenging of counter-mythologies and the crafting of a
media-centric grand narrative. I wonder if omas Hughes’s Networks
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of Power could be put into this tradition, given his expansive under-
standing of agents of change? en there is the comparative institution-
al analysis approach, into which I would put your Network Nation and
Paul Starr’s Creation of e Media: Political Origins of Modern Com -
muni ca tion. In the closely related field of legal studies we can also think
of e Master Switch by Tim Wu, although as you wrote in your fore-
word to the Chinese edition of Network Nation, Wu’s book relied on
outdated secondary scholarship. e third approach is phenomenology,
a tradition that can be stretched to include Claude Fischer’s America
Calling, Carolyn Marvin’s When Old Technologies Were New, and
om as Streeter’s e Net Effect: Romanticism, Capitalism, and the In -
ter net. 
John: Can we bring together these three quite different approaches?
Much depends on what questions you are asking. If you are interested,
as I am, in communications networks, then it seems to me that compar-
ative institutionalism holds the most promise. In fact, when I was in
graduate school, I had hoped to work with Paul Starr (a Daniel Bell stu-
dent); unfortunately, Starr didn’t get tenure at Harvard, which preclud-
ed me from having him on my committee. I have already commented
on my indebtedness to Innis’s concept of communications “bias.” Phe -
nomenology is trickier. Communications networks have indeed been
shaped by cultural norms, as Marvin and Streeter documented, and
users matter, as Fischer demonstrated. Yet none of these works really
engages with political economy. is is not necessarily a problem,
though it does point up some enduring, and very possibly unresolvable,
tensions in the field.
Where Hughes fits is an interesting question. ough he regarded
himself as a contextualist, which in your tripartite scheme would prob-
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ably align him with the phenomenologists, the causal significance he
assigned to technological momentum has affinities with the internalism
of Innis and McLuhan. 
I would classify Hughes as a comparative institutionalist, though it
is a tribute to the breadth of his vision that he might be put into either
of your other two categories.
Let me say a bit more about Hughes, whom I met several times,
and with whom I had numerous opportunities to exchange ideas.
Hughes is best known for writing about big-city electrical power sta-
tions, which he termed “systems.” I have learned a great deal from him
— but, perhaps above all, he taught me about the importance of the city
as a unit of analysis.
Hughes’s approach to the history of technology was quite different
from my mentor, Alfred Chandler. Chandler was ultimately less inter-
ested in the context in which large-scale organizations operated than in
their internal workings. In the useful terminology of John Staude n -
maier, author of Technology’s Storytellers, this made Hughes a contextu-
alist and Chandler an internalist. I have found the distinction between
internalism and contextualism useful in my own research. Like Hughes,
I am a contextualist, even though I am drawn, as was Hughes himself,
to the internalist agenda that preoccupied Chandler.
Hughes was more interested in language than Chandler, or, at least,
he was more willing to talk about it. One year, at an annual meeting of
the Society for the History of Technology (SHOT), Hughes and I were
on the same panel. In his presentation, if I remember correctly, he told
the audience that he was a “systems” person and that I was a “networks”
person. I am quite certain that he confided this to me in private. Even
though I had earlier written a book with “system” in the title, when he
made this comment he was right. I remain sensitive to the problems
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with the “network” concept — problems that Leo Marx, Rosalind
Williams, and many others have written about. Even so I find network
to be the best metaphor to describe the institutions that we have devised
to circulate information from person to person over large distances and
at high speed.
As Hughes’s comments suggest, he and I have a lot in common.
But in one regard we are quite different. In my writing, I have empha-
sized the causal agency of the political economy, while Hughes has
remained committed to the organization — which, famously, he called
the “system.” For Hughes, the regulatory environment was an after-
thought; for me, it was constitutive. Price-and-entry regulation was a
precondition for the rise of the big-city telephone exchange, not a con-
sequence of its rise. Politics for Hughes mucked thing up; I regard it as
generative. Even so, Hughes — who, after all, was an exemplary histo-
rian in every regard — definitely influenced my thinking about units of
analysis. Following his example, I have come to conceive of the urban
telephone exchange as a system embedded in a larger regional, interre-
gional, and, eventually, even national network. My characterization of
the mail as “system” in Spreading the News also owed something to
Hughes — though, as I noted above, I have since become more of a
“networks” person than a “systems” person.
Wu’s Master Switch, while influential, is quite derivative and lack-
ing in analytical heft, as Paul Duguid and Paul Starr documented in
devastating reviews. While Wu wrote in a fluid and engaging style, he
overplayed the importance of maverick inventors, neglected the key role
of municipal governments in the regulatory process, and echoed Bell
public relations hype in his characterization of Vail, whose prescience
he overstated, and long-distance telephony, whose significance he exag-
gerated. 
The Historical Role of Communication Networks





Fischer made too much of the conversational habits of housewives
in explaining the popularization of the telephone, a common mistake in
much of the scholarship published around the time he completed his
research. e telephone, not the telegraph, was the first electrically me -
diated communications medium to have been configured as a mass serv-
ice for the entire population, rather than a specialty service for an exclu-
sive clientele. e concepts “mass service” and “specialty service,” inci-
dentally, pay homage to the distinction that historian of technology
Phil Scranton made between “mass” and “specialty” production.
But the question remains: who did the configuring? e key actors
were not the users who discovered new ways of communicating by tele-
phone — by inventing, as Fischer put it, “sociability” — but, instead,
the managers of the big-city operating companies who recognized that
they could make money — and, not incidentally, insulate themselves
from political pressure — by aggressively marketing telephone service to
the entire population. In both Chicago and New York City, this shift
occurred around 1900 — long before Fischer’s California housewives
began gossiping on-line. 
e most intriguing challenge to my argument in my view has
come not from Fischer, but from Robert MacDougall. In his splendid
book, e People’s Network, MacDougall has made an intriguing case
for the agency in the 1890s of telephone users in mid-western U. S.
cities in convincing the managers of non-Bell independent telephone
operating companies to popularize the new medium. Users matter.
Even so, the kind of technical, administrative, and political challenges
that these independent telephone companies confronted were far less
complex than the challenges that faced big-city telephone companies in
Chicago and New York City. For this reason, I regard 1900 — a con-
venient date, since it ushered in a new century — as a landmark in the
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history of telecommunications, since it marked the approximate
moment at which big-city telephone companies shifted from providing
a specialty service for an exclusive clientele to providing a mass service
for the entire population. Popularization and sociability are not the
same thing. And even if you find MacDougall’s account of telephone
popularization more compelling — in my view it is a matter of big cities
(John) versus middle sized towns (McDougall), with the most impor-
tant technical, administrative, and marketing innovations originating in
the former (John) — the shift he described had nothing to do with
Fischer’s California housewives. 
Five books that you didn’t mention, but that, in my view, make
notable contributions to our understanding of communications net-
works in the period between the 1840s and the 1910s, are Ben
Schwantes’s Train and the Telegraph; Simone Müller’s Wiring the
World; Christopher Beauchamp’s Invented by Law; Heidi Tworek’s
News over Germany; and Robert MacDougall’s People’s Network. I can
also recommend, as a very readable general history of the U. S. post of -
fice, Winifred Gallagher’s How the Post Office Created America.
Jin: e “romantic individualism” narrative that foregrounds a hero or
inventor has long enjoyed a privileged place in the history of technolo-
gy. Network Nation is a corrective to this narrative. e “romantic indi-
vidualism” narrative continues to dominate today’s tech media coverage
and popular discourse, except that we now focus not on Samuel Morse
or eodore Vail but on Steve Jobs and Mark Zuckerberg. Why do
people at different times find “romantic individualism” so compelling?
How does Network Nation counter “romantic individualism”?
John: Romantic individualism sells books, and, by no means inciden-
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tally, wins patent battles. is is particularly true in the United States,
where, until recently, the patent office recognized as the rightful inven-
tor not the first to file, but the first to invent, a topic that Beauchamp
explored with great sensitivity in Invented by Law. 
e almost always laudatory, and, indeed, often fawning, preoccu-
pation of today’s journalists and tech insiders with the current genera-
tion of high-tech moguls is a byproduct not only of the influence they
wield as owners and managers, but also of public relations hype. PR is
part of history, and historians have an obligation to do all we can to
describe it, explain how it works, and prevent it from distorting the his-
torical record. 
Hype is a neglected factor in historical writing, not only because
publicity has and can shape the course of events, but also because it can
inform historical interpretation. e idealization of Jobs and Zucker -
berg is but the most recent chapter in the long history of the influence
of corporate public relations on business history. Morse needed public-
ity to sell his telegraph patent rights; Vail used the press to blunt calls
for government ownership. Individuals matter in history, but they don’t
always make history as they please. If, however, they have a capable
enough PR team, they can do their best to make sure that their version
of events ends up in the history books. e same, needless to say, can
be said of corporations, political parties, and nations.
To underscore my point about hype, let me retell a story that I
recounted in Network Nation. e inability of Samuel Morse to secure
a market for his invention helps explain why his backers (including the
patent commissioner) praised it to the skies. How else could he win the
congressional support he needed to convince Congress to buy him out?
Morse’s electric telegraph became famous not because it was the
first to be commercialized: it was not, having been preceded by the
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commercialization in Great Britain of an electric telegraph that had
been invented by William Cooke and Charles Wheatstone. 
Why then do we remember Morse and not Cooke and Wheat -
stone? In large part, because of the influence of hype on the course of
events — and on history writing. 
Morse had no choice but to publicize his telegraph. is was
because, unlike Cooke and Wheatstone, Morse lacked a reliable market.
Cooke and Wheatstone had discovered that railroads would pay to use
the electric telegraph as a signaling device. is was not true of railroads
in the United States, as Ben Schwantes demonstrated in his prize-win-
ning Train and e Telegraph. And so Morse was stuck: he had to pub-
licize the telegraph, since, unlike Cooke and Wheatstone, he didn’t
have a reliable user that was willing to foot the bill.
To tempt investors, Morse’s silent partner Francis O. J. Smith
praised Morse to the skies (even though Smith personally despised
Morse as a charlatan and a fool). Morse’s invention also received lavish
coverage in patent commissioner Henry Leavitt Ellsworth’s annual
reports. Morse’s invention helped Ellsworth not only to boost the rep-
utation of the government agency over which he presided, but also to
advertise American inventive genius in an age in which Great Britain
proclaimed itself the “workshop of the world.” 
Another consideration may well have shaped Ellsworth’s decision.
Morse had fallen hopelessly in love with Ellsworth’s daughter, Anne —
as Ellsworth well knew — raising the possibility that, by boosting
Morse, Ellsworth may have been helping to try to secure for his daugh-
ter a handsome dowry. Anne is best known as the woman who is cred-
ited with choosing for the first telegraph message the Biblical phrase
“What Hath God Wrought.” For Morse, she was, or so he hoped, his
future bride.
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Morse’s “romantic individualism” was very different from the aura
that has come to surround Steve Jobs or Mark Zuckerberg. Morse was
an artist and not a promoter and he had no interest in commercializing
the new medium himself. Instead, Morse hoped to sell his invention to
the very government that had awarded him his patent. Ellsworth — the
patent commissioner — did everything he could to close the deal. Nice
work if you can get it. e only problem was, Congress wouldn’t go
along — and much to Morse’s chagrin the telegraph was commercial-
ized as a private enterprise.
What began as hype became history, and, over time, a publicity
campaign gone wrong became transmogrified into a simple-minded
fairy tale about Morse’s genius. In this retelling, Morse fought single-
handedly against all manner of adversaries, and Anne Ellsworth became
not Morse’s love interest, but merely a star-stuck little girl in the pres-
ence of the Great Man.
Morse was by no means the last American telegraph promoter to
turn to publicity to improve his position. In the 1870s and 1880s, Jay
Gould, then the nation’s most notorious financial speculator, manipu-
lated the press on numerous occasions to affect the price of Western
Union shares — another media event that I documented in detail in
Network Nation.
Publicity was, if anything, even more consequential for the history
of the telephone. To blunt public pressure for government ownership,
Bell publicists popularized the idea that long-distance telephony was
one of the technical wonders of the age. If the public identified Bell as
innovative, lawmakers would be less inclined to buy it out. 
Jin: We cannot, of course, ignore the importance of culture in the pop-
ularization of the telephone. As we know, Carolyn Marvin’s When Old
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Technologies Were New emphasizes cultural determinants such as gen-
der. In Network Nation you mentioned that office clerks in Chicago
gossiped about sports on the telephone, yet Claude Fischer thinks that
women in small towns in California drove the popularization of the
telephone, and in my research, I found that women in Shanghai were
quite enthusiastic about shopping by telephone. What then was more
important, culture or institutions?
John: e one-sentence answer is that institutions and culture both
matter, but that I have found, in my research, that institutions matter
more. 
I am not surprised that Shanghai women liked to shop by tele-
phone. Many women in the United States did too. Yet I have not seen
any evidence that telephone shopping posed a problem for operating
company managers. Women rarely lived in big-city commercial centers,
the epicenter of telephone congestion. Telephone managers in the
1890s and 1900s devoted a great deal of thought and resources to re -
ducing the call-connection delay. Office clerks clogging telephone lines
to gossip about sports and their personal affairs was one of the most dis-
ruptive factors that they could not control. Fischer mostly wrote about
the post-First World War period, long after the initial popularization of
the telephone in Chicago and New York City, which, as I observed in
my response to a previous question, occurred around 1900. 
e business strategy of big-city Bell-affiliated telephone companies
helps to explain why telephone managers in the 1890s occasionally
blamed women for gossiping on-line. Garrulous male office clerks
posed a more serious operational problem, since the most congested
telephone exchanges were located in the downtown business district,
which was in this period an overwhelmingly male preserve. Blaming
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women for a problem that had in fact been caused by men helped tele-
phone company officials maintain good relations with their most valu-
able customers — that is, the businessmen who paid for flat-rate tele-
phone service. e vilification of women as loquacious gossips helped to
discredit flat-rate telephone billing, hastening the shift in Chicago, New
York, and several other big-city exchanges to measured service.
Operator-assisted switching was expensive, impeding telephone popu-
larization. Local flat-rate service would not return until several decades
later, following the widespread introduction of the automatic telephone
exchange.
Jin: Specialists in media and communication studies are often fascinat-
ed by the newness of a particular technology, especially if it can be plau-
sibly characterized as path-breaking. People tend to constantly project
too many unrealistic aspirations onto new media objects and turn a deaf
ear to the institutional or cultural contexts embedded in technology.
Since both the postal system and the telephone were once “new media,”
how does Spreading the News and Network Nation deal with “newness”? 
John: e novelty of the telegraph was a problem for its first promoters,
since, at least at first, they had no reliable market. is circumstance
goes far toward explaining, as I have already discussed, why there was so
much more effusive commentary about the telegraph in the United
States than in Great Britain, and why we remember American telegraph
inventor Samuel Morse and not the British inventors William Cooke
and Charles Wheatstone. Cooke and Wheatstone had the railroad:
Morse looked to Congress to buy him out.
e telephone was less novel than the telegraph: it was basically a
high-end message delivery service. It is worth recalling, for example,
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that the average distance of a telephone call originating in 1900 in Chi -
cago (then the second largest city in the United States) was a mere 3.4
miles. is is one reason, among many, that the telephone was less
hyped. Merchants, professionals, and industrialists had a pressing need
to remain in touch with their suppliers and customers. If the call-con-
nection delay could be reduced — a big “if,” at least in the 1880s, given
the limited state-of-the-art of switchboard design — and the network
was built up enough to connect the right kind of people, business users
were willing to foot the bill. 
Newness, in short, is not only or even primarily an intrinsic attrib-
ute of a network; no less significant was the political, economic, and
cultural setting in which the network evolved. In some instances, in -
deed, newness can be little more than promotional hype.
III: Politics Had Artifacts
Jin: In one passage in Network Nation, you include a very important
phrase: “politics had artifacts.” How do you interpret that? Is this a
reversal of Langdon Winner’s “Do Artifacts Have Politics?”
John: I was indeed thinking of Winner — a political theorist whose
work I much admire. Winner’s basic unit of analysis was the technical
artifact — such as a bridge or a nuclear power plant. He is concerned
with the effects of these artifacts on political forms and cultural norms.
My unit of analysis is the political economy. e telegraph and the tele-
phone evolved differently for reasons that had less to do with technolo-
gy or economics than with politics and culture. Winner is less interested
in this relationship, which is why I found useful his provocative ques-
tion “do artifacts have politics?” By recasting it, I highlighted a contrast
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in emphasis and in method. 
Jin: Your book argues that though the telephone is technically indebted
to the telegraph, organizationally it is closer to the mail. How do you
distinguish innovation from invention, and what do you mean by that
distinction?
John: e telegraph and the telephone both rely on electricity as a
motive power. But they are otherwise quite different. e first tele-
phone operating companies had more in common with message deliv-
ery services and gas works than with telegraph companies. When eo -
dore Vail became president of Bell, he built on his experience at the
Post Office Department. Innovation is the scaling up of invention,
through its commercialization. When an invention became widely used,
it became a genuine innovation, making it for the comparative institu-
tionalist, the more appropriate subject for inquiry.
e maintenance of communications networks is also, I might add,
a worthy topic for research. ough I didn’t write about maintenance
much in either Spreading the News or Network Nation, it has been
drawn to my attention as a historical subject by Lee Vinsel and Andrew
L. Russell in their influential recent book, e Innovation Delusion.
Jin: We know that technology is a central force and driving mechanism
in capitalism, with the business firm as its primary institutional unit.
How did Network Nation place itself at the intersection of three differ-
ent academic genres: the history of technology, business history, and
comparative institutionalism?
John: Network Nation explored the relationship between the political
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economy and the certain technically advanced business enterprises, of
which the largest and most powerful were Western Union, the Bell
System, and the largest big-city telephone operating companies, includ-
ing the Chicago Telephone Company and the New York Telephone
Company. I tried to identify key decision makers (as is de rigueur for a
business history), and to show how technical artifacts, such as the tele-
phone switchboard, evolved (as is customary for a history of technolo-
gy). I was also interested in the political economy in which these organ-
izations operated (a keynote of comparative institutionalism). 
A fourth subfield that I drew upon, incidentally, is known as
American Political Development (or APD). is subfield, which origi-
nated in political science, emphasizes path dependence, heuristics, and
institutional legacies. Each of these concepts has proved very useful in
my thinking about communications networks.
Jin: I read Network Nation as part of an academic dialogue between you
and your mentor, Alfred Chandler, Jr. In Visible Hand, Chandler chart-
ed the rise of the salaried managerial class in organizing and running
large-scale enterprises, and contended that the corporation’s organiza-
tional structure developed in response to its business strategy. You
argue, in contrast, that the business strategy of communications firms
such as Western Union and Bell had been shaped by political structures
(governmental institutions and civic ideals). But I notice that the final
chapter of Network Nation affirms the value of managerial capitalism, as
you refer to the rise of Bell’s managerial elite as a self-perpetuating class
that resisted the financial pressure of investors, while they negotiated
and compromised with the government. is elite was the coordinator
that made the Bell System work. Does this go back to Chandler’s argu-
ment?
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John: is question gets to the heart of a topic that, in retrospect, I have
come to regard as central to the argument I made in the final chapter of
Network Nation: the legitimation of the managerial corporation. It is a
topic that I have returned to now in my current project on anti-monop-
oly thought.
When I began my research for Network Nation, I assumed, follow-
ing Chandler, that the railroad was the first managerial corporation, and
that the managerial corporation originated in the 1850s, when the four
East Coast trunk lines crossed the Appalachian Mountains. Middle
man agement in government, it bears repeating, had existed in the Post
Office Department since 1800: someone had to staff the distributions
centers. In business, however, middle management — and with it, the
managerial corporation, would not emerge until mid-century.
Chandler wrote more in Visible Hand about the railroad than the
telegraph. Yet when Chandler wrote about the telegraph, he followed
Robert Luther ompson’s Wiring a Continent, which had character-
ized Western Union as a “natural” monopoly following its takeover of
its two primary rivals in 1866. ompson reached this conclusion, I am
convinced, because he was trying to find a convenient way to wrap up
his book, which had devoted many chapters to the pre-Civil War peri-
od. To justifying ending his book in 1866, he mystified the history of
the telegraph for the rest of the century.
For Chandler, then, the managerial corporation had been legitimat-
ed in both transportation and communication by 1866.
My research led me to raise questions about both of these claims.
ough the railroad did have multiple layers of management, it would
only slowly acquire legitimacy as a managerial enterprise, that is, an en -
terprise that, while ostensibly owned by its shareholders, was in fact
operated by and for a self-perpetuating managerial elite. Richard White
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has made this point quite effectively in Railroaded, his recent history of
the transcontinental railroad, in which he shows how financial insiders,
rather than expert managers, dominated the inner circles of the first rail-
road corporations to span the continent.
Similarly, while Western Union was the dominant network pro -
vider in 1866, no one regarded its ascendancy as apolitical. 
For these reasons, I would now date the ascendancy of the manage-
rial corporation to the 1910s, rather than to the mid-nineteenth centu-
ry. For it was only at this time that the managerial corporation became
widely accepted as a legitimate form of business enterprise.
Chandler sidestepped the question of legitimacy by downplaying
the influence on the business enterprise of governmental institutions
and civic ideals. In addition, he wrote virtually nothing about the public
relations campaigns that corporate managers launched to legitimate
their enterprises. Bell managers invented corporate public relations in
the 1910s to forestall a government takeover, and ramped up their ef -
forts following the U. S. entry in the First World War in 1917. PR mat-
ters, even if its significance is often downplayed, forgotten, and re -
pressed. Roland Marchand’s magnificent Creating the Corporate Soul —
which brilliantly dissected Bell’s 1910s PR campaign — showed how
the process worked.
IV: e Long History of Anti-Monopoly
Jin: In your study of the history of telecommunications you demon-
strate that anti-monopoly has fostered innovation, and that market seg-
mentation, municipal franchise regulation, and government entrepre-
neurship have led to a series of highly innovative communication sys-
tems from the Post Office Department to the Bell System. Why is a net-
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work organization like Bell more likely to acquire a monopoly than
other firms? Why were policies such as uniform rates (or what today
might be called “net neutrality”) counterproductive?
John: e willingness of contemporaries to invest great significance in
what economists today call network externalities can help explain why
the Bell System took the form that it did. By 1907, for example, tele-
phone experts agreed that rival big-city telephone operating companies
were wasteful, a huge win for Bell. is outcome, however, was a con-
sequence not only of technology and economics, but also of politics and
culture. 
Municipal franchise law established the rules of the game, and it
could be very expensive to obtain the urban rights-of-way necessary to
string telephone wires. Political corruption was endemic and many city
officials were in on the take. 
e specter of corrupt city aldermen profiting from municipal fran-
chise politics greatly troubled reformers. Ending intra-city telephone
competition was one way to limit graft. Telephone company managers
agreed. By re-envisioning telephone service as not a privilege but a right
— a shift that hastened, and was in part hastened by, the rapid expan-
sion of their user base — they built an electoral bloc interested in good
telephone service that was large enough to enable them to prevail
against corrupt city officials. 
What deserves emphasis, in short, is the creative role of government
regulation, and in particular, in the case of the telephone, municipal
franchise law. Regulation can foster innovation that makes the fruits of
invention accessible to all. In the case of the telephone, it hastened its
popularization — which I defined as the reconfiguration of a specialty
service for an exclusive clientele as a mass service for the entire popula-
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tion. 
e telegraph was more lightly regulated than the telephone: pre-
dictably enough, it was much less innovative. e only exception was a
brief period of hothouse growth in the 1870s that had been spurred by
the anti-monopoly National Telegraph Act of 1866. e National
Telegraph Act had been intended to promote competition among tele-
graph network providers, and for a brief period, it worked. Taking ad -
vantage of the act’s provisions, rival telegraph magnates William Orton
and Jay Gould squared off in an epic contest to gain control of patents
held by the inventors omas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. In a
remarkably short period of time, the Edison-Bell rivalry led to four
blockbuster inventions: broadband telegraphy, the telephone, the pho -
no graph, and the electric power station. 
e telephone was always highly regulated, and, with a few excep-
tions, such as automatic telephony, the Bell System would remain for
much of the twentieth-century — and especially following the estab-
lishment of Bell Labs in 1925 — a world leader in churning out block-
buster inventions of all kinds. Telegraph rates varied by type of user
(news brokers got lower rates than merchants); telephone rates varied
not only by user type (business versus residential) but also by various
other criteria (including quality of service). Beginning in 1910, Con -
gress declared the telegraph and the telephone to be common carriers
under federal law. Common carriage did not oblige network providers
to charge the same price for the same service, as proponents of “net neu-
trality” would later advocate; rather, it fostered a byzantine array of
cross subsidies that would remain central to the Bell System until its
court-ordered dissolution in 1984.
Net neutrality is not neutral. On the contrary, it is biased in favor
of information-intensive Big Tech platforms such as Google, Amazon,
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and Netflix to the disadvantage of information service providers, brick-
and-mortar retailers, and the press. Telephone rates were always regu-
lated — first at the municipal level and for much of the twentieth cen-
tury at the state level. No one regarded these regulations as neutral; on
the contrary, they were intended to promote a particular vision of the
common good.
Jin: How is the monopoly power of today’s Big Tech platforms differ-
ent from the monopoly power of the industrial trusts of a century ago,
such as Standard Oil and the Bell System? How can the historical tra-
dition of anti-monopoly in telecommunications help us critically think
about monopoly today?
John: ese are searching questions that lie at the heart of the “new
Brandeisian” critique of Big Tech platforms that FTC commissioner
Lina Khan has embraced, drawing on the work of non-neoclassical eco -
nomists, historians, and journalists. 
Let me highlight a few comparisons that may help to provide a per-
spective on current events. First: my premise. Big Tech publicists have
repeatedly tried to convince the public that we are living in a brave new
world in which all the rules have changed. is is simply not true. Big
Tech continues to operate in a political economy that was built up over
the decades. By challenging the hype, historians can underscore the
merits of longstanding principles such as common carriage, market seg-
mentation, and even municipal price-and-entry regulations. 
Common carriage — that is, the presumption that a network pro -
vider has an obligation to provide access to a service on a non-preferen-
tial basis — is a cornerstone of American communications policy.
Common carriage is not the same thing as net neutrality: cross subsi-
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dization has been the norm, with different classes of information paying
different rates. Within a class, however, all information has been treated
alike. 
Market segmentation has shaped U. S. communications policy for
over one hundred years. e 1913 McReynolds settlement, for exam-
ple, which is often misleadingly called the Kingsbury Commitment —
thanks in large part to Bell public relations hype — forced Bell to sell
off its shares in Western Union, which it had acquired in 1909. ough
the McReynolds settlement is rarely featured in histories of U. S. com-
munication policy, it had far reaching consequences, since it doomed
Vail’s vision of “universal service,” which Vail understood to embrace
low-cost short-distance telephone service and low-cost long-distance
telegraph service. To put the first great Big Tech anti-trust settlement
in terms that might be easier to grasp, the McReynolds settlement cost
“AT&T” its second “T”: AT&T, after all, stands for “American Tele -
phone & Telegraph.” 
Anti-trust pressure in the 1920s blocked Bell from becoming a
player in radio broadcasting. In 1956, the justice department obliged
Bell to license its patents on a non-preferential basis, and to exit the
computer business; in 1984, it chose to give up its operating companies
to settle yet another antitrust suit, opening up the market to rivals that
in the years to come would hasten a great deal of experimentation in the
telecommunications sector. Anti-trust is not the only regulatory tool
that the government has at its disposal. Yet it reminds us that the future
of telecommunications need not resemble its past. 
Municipal price-and-entry regulations were of enormous signifi-
cance in the early years of the telephone business, and in the United
States would remain in place until 1996. e absence of such regula-
tions in Canadian cities — as Robert MacDougall has demonstrated —
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slowed the popularization of telephone service, a nice illustration of the
analytical potential of comparative institutionalism.
V: Toward a Digital Future
Jin: It has been over ten years since the publication of Network Nation.
e past decade has seen the emergence of a global point-to-point dig-
ital interconnected society, and the invasion of our daily lives by the Big
Tech platforms. If we were to extrapolate from your argument, we
might conclude that these changes have been “products not only of
technological imperatives and economic incentives, but also of govern-
mental institutions and civic ideals.” Given the upcoming publication
of the Chinese translation of Network Nation, why is the U. S. experi-
ence important for readers in different institutional and cultural con-
texts, such as China?
John: ough the U. S. political economy is very different from
China’s, political interventions in both countries have powerfully
shaped the institutional order. Big Tech platforms are, in one form or
another, here to stay. Yet their power can be constrained.
Decentralization can be planned, as Chandler reminded us in his
pioneering books and articles on the American corporation. Planned
decentralization is also, of course, a hallmark of federalism — a corner-
stone of the American experiment in self-government. 
In the years since the publication of Network Nation, it has become
increasingly evident to thoughtful lawmakers from across the political
spectrum that Big Tech imperils the constitutional order that has tradi-
tionally fostered the common good. Amazon, Facebook, and Google —
to name but three of today’s High Tech behemoths — have become
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powerful actors on the global stage, with a raft of implications for inno-
vation, inequality, and civic norms.
e U. S. experience can help Chinese leaders recognize that mar-
kets are politically constructed. Anti-monopoly laws have proved effec-
tive in segmenting markets to promote what contemporaries called “fair
trade,” while common carriage regulations have bolstered insurgent
new entrants and restrained incumbents. Municipal regulation, a regu-
latory tool that is often disparaged by policy analysts, has proved sur-
prisingly effective in popularizing new media, such as municipal broad-
band. 
Jin: In the introduction of Network Nation, you wrote that “the net-
work metaphor highlights the spatiality of early American telecommu-
nications.” Chicago and New York played a crucial role in the early his-
tory of American telephony. Similarly, the port cities Shanghai and
Tianjin have played an important role in Chinese telecommunications.
My question, then, is twofold: on the one hand, what does a city mean
to a telecommunications network? on the other hand, what does the
telecommunications network mean to the city?
John: Cities have for centuries been seedbeds of innovation not only in
business, but also in public policy. Nowhere is this more true than in
telecommunications. Spatial propinquity can help create a fertile
ground for the implementation of new methods and techniques. Re -
curring contests over rights-of-way created incentives that hastened
popularization, especially if municipal price-and-entry regulations re -
mained in place. Unfortunately, historians of telecommunications rou-
tinely assume that the nation is the most relevant unit of analysis, put-
ting at center stage an actor that, at least in the formative era of the tele-
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phone, properly belongs in the wings. 
e critical role of the city as an agent of change was one of the
most important discoveries that I made in the course of researching
Network Nation. I had not initially intended to write about big-city tele-
phone operating companies; in fact, when I discovered how prominent-
ly they figured in the documentary record, I initially felt demoralized.
How was I possibly going to finish a project that had already taken me
more time than I had anticipated? I had two small children at the time,
and I was eager to get on with my life. And so too, perhaps needless to
say, was my wife!
Once I discovered how important cities were to the early history of
the telephone, I had what one might describe as a gestalt shift. A subject
that virtually every other historian of communications had regarded as
peripheral, with the notable exceptions of Robert MacDougall, Meig -
han Maguire, and Robert Horwitz, turned out to be absolutely central.
Spatial propinquity mattered, not only for telephone managers coping
with the unprecedented challenge of shortening the call-connection de -
lay in big-city telephone exchanges, but also for telephone inventors. 
Chicago and New York City were the key sites of innovation, with
Chicago being ground zero. In both cities, municipal franchise law set
the stage. Yet people mattered too. In Chicago, the popularization of
the new medium owed much to the visionary leadership of Angus Hib -
bard, the manager of the Bell-affiliated Chicago Telephone Company.
In the 1890s, Hibbard introduced innovative high-speed operator-
assisted switchboards, experimented with new kinds of telephone sets
— including the pay-as-you-go nickel-in-the-slot — and devised new
billing schemes that helped to shift telephone users from flat rate to
measures service. Hibbard’s strategy effectively mobilized the city’s
dense network of technical expertise: the Chicago Telephone Com -
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pany’s downtown telephone exchanges were located a short distance
from the massive factories of Western Electric, Bell’s equipment suppli-
er. Flat rates were regressive: they favored big-business users and imped-
ed widespread adoption. With the introduction of measured service, it
became for the first time commercially feasible to provide at least a basic
level of service to the entire population. By 1900, a new age had begun. 
Jin: My last question relates to the history of technology. e global
COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the indispensability of information
and communications technology (ICT) for parcel delivery and social
interaction — e.g. in academic conferences organized through Zoom
and Tencent. ICT is fast becoming a focus for research throughout the
humanities and the social sciences. One is reminded of this statement
by Mark Poster: “One cannot but see earlier developments from the sit-
uation of the present.” Are institutions today different from the institu-
tions you studied? 
John: In the United States, China, and many other nations, Big Tech
poses lawmakers with a modern-day variant of the imperio in imperium
problem that perplexed political theorists in the Middle Ages. In the
present, as in the past, politics have artifacts and political structure
shapes business strategy. But what is the relevant political unit? e po -
litical economy that shaped the telegraph and the telephone in the
United States was at once national, subnational, and transnational.
When we think about ICT today, we might want to keep this in mind:
the nation is not the only, and in some instances not even the most con-
sequential, unit of analysis. 
More communications is not necessarily the same thing as better
communications either now or in the past. Historical inquiry can show
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how mutual understanding has strengthened essential social bonds, pro-
moted worthwhile innovations, and fostered moral progress. Yet noth-
ing is certain and, if things go badly, poor communications is, as an
independent factor, rarely to blame. In interpersonal relations, as well
as in our fleeting attempts to glimpse eternity, misunderstanding is a
feature and not a bug.
Let me add, as a final observation, that I am very grateful for the
care you have taken in reading my work and posing such searching and
well-informed questions. I have learned a good deal from this exchange,
and look forward to learning more about your own promising research
on the history of Chinese telecommunications.
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